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Abstract 
Poor countries are more heavily affected by extreme weather events and future climate change 
than rich countries. One of the reasons for this is the so-called adaptation deficit, that is, limits in 
the ability of poorer countries to adapt. This paper analyses the link between income and 
adaptation to climate events theoretically and empirically. We postulate that the adaptation deficit 
may be due to two factors: A demand effect, whereby the demand for the good ―climate security‖ 
increases with income, and an efficiency effect, which works as a spill-over externality on the 
supply-side: Adaptation productivity in high-income countries is enhanced because of factors like 
better public services and stronger institutions. Using panel data from the Munich Re natural 
catastrophe database we find strong evidence for a demand effect for adaptation to two climate-
related extreme events, tropical cyclones and floods. Evidence on the efficiency effect is more 
equivocal. There are some indications that adaptation in rich countries might be more efficient, 
but the evidence is far from conclusive. The implication for research is that better data, in 
particular on adaptation effort, need to be collected to understand adaptation efficiency. In terms 
of policy, we conclude that inclusive growth policies (which boost adaptation demand) should be 
an important component of international efforts to close the adaptation deficit. 
Keywords:  climate change, adaptation, development, extreme events, disaster risk 
JEL classification:    O11, O13, Q54, Q56 
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1. Introduction  
There is broad agreement that low-income countries are more vulnerable to current climate 
variability and future climate change than rich countries (e.g. World Bank 2013).  The insight is 
based partly on forward looking studies that assess the likely impact of future climate change 
(Tol 2002a, b, Parry et al. 2007) and partly on empirical evidence that looks at the impact of 
extreme climate events in the past (Kahn 2005, Toya and Skidmore 2007). 
Various explanations have been proffered as to why this is the case. Some authors point to the 
higher exposure of low-income countries to climate risk, for example due to a semi-arid climate 
or the concentration of populations in hazard zones. Others highlight the high sensitivity of low-
income countries to such risks because of their heavy reliance on agriculture. Both these factors 
clearly matter (Bowen et al. 2012; Schumacher and Strobl 2011). 
However, the most powerful explanation is arguably the existence of an adaptation deficit in low-
income countries (the term is due to Burton 2009). Low-income countries are less able to deal 
with climate events because they lack the institutional, financial or technological capacity to 
adapt effectively (Yohe and Tol, 2002; Tol and Yohe, 2007, Brooks et al., 2005, Barr et al., 
2010).  
The aim of this paper is to shed further analytical and empirical light on the nature of the 
adaptation deficit. In particular, we ask whether the deficit is the result of inefficiencies in the 
provision of adaptation services or the rational allocation of scarce resources to more pressing 
needs.  
The answer is important because it informs the appropriate policy response to high climate 
vulnerability. Inefficiencies in the provision of adaptation services would call for measures to 
boost adaptation efficiency. If the main cause is different priorities within a tight budget, the right 
solution may be growth policies to loosen the budget constraint (Schelling 1992, 1997) – bearing 
in mind that certain types of growth can increase sensitivity to climate events (Bowen et al 2012).  
Theoretically, we find that both these factors may play a role: Income can affect the level of 
climate security first through a demand effect and second through an efficiency effect. The 
demand effect is straightforward: If the good ―climate security‖ – or adaptation – has a positive 
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income elasticity, rich countries will demand more of it.  The efficiency effect works through an 
externality on the supply-side.  Rich countries have more of certain assets – such as good public 
services, sound institutions and the ability to process knowledge – which are welfare-enhancing 
in their own right, but also have spill-overs for climate security. That is, they make the production 
of the good ―climate security‖ more efficient. 
We then seek to identify the two effects empirically, using panel data on climate-related natural 
disasters for a large number of countries between 1980 and 2008. The idea of using natural 
disaster data to identify adaptive capacity goes back at least to Yohe and Tol (2002; also Tol and 
Yohe 2007). However, those papers were primarily interested in the degree of substitutability 
between adaptation factors, and their analysis was limited, in part due to the use of cross-
sectional data. Other contributions are concerned with effects of disasters on economic growth 
(e.g. Noy 2009, Strobl 2010, 2011, McDermott et al. 2013) as opposed to explaining the severity 
of the disaster losses. There is also a strand of literature on the welfare impacts of economic 
―disasters‖ (Barro 2006, Gabaix 2008).  
Our approach and aim are similar to recent contributions by Bakkensen (2013) Hsiang and Narita 
(2012), and Schumacher and Strobl (2011), while also building on earlier work by Kahn (2005), 
Anbarci et al. (2005), Toya and Skidmore (2007), and Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008). However, 
we deviate from those papers in several important ways.  
On the theoretical side, our main innovation is the explicit distinction between supply (production 
efficiency) factors and demand factors in explaining adaptation to extreme events. Most of the 
existing literature seeks to explain the adaptation deficit by reference to the demand side. The 
motivation for additional protection is derived from an increasingly valuable stock of assets, 
which makes further adaptation worthwhile (e.g. Schumacher and Strobl, 2011; Hallegatte, 2013; 
Hsiang and Narita (2012).  In our framework, adaptation is determined by a desire for greater 
(personal) protection from environmental risks, which is compared, importantly, to the cost of 
providing this protection. 
Hsiang and Narita (2012) model optimal adaptation as a function of initial wealth, time 
preferences and hazard exposure. They predict that optimal adaptation is increasing in hazard 
exposure and in initial wealth. However, their model ignores the relative costs of adaptation (or 
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its efficiency) and how these might vary with different levels of adaptation effort, capital stocks 
and wealth. The models of Schumacher and Strobl (2011) and Hallegatte (2013) both focus on 
the interaction of hazard exposure and wealth. Both models also allow for decreasing 
effectiveness (or increasing costs) of adaptation as effort increases, but neither allows for varying 
levels of efficiency in the supply of adaptation.  
Our empirical contribution follows from the predictions of the theoretical model. We test 
explicitly for evidence of both a demand and a supply (efficiency) effect in the level of adaptation 
to disaster risk. The empirical setup is relatively flexible on the demand side, compared to the 
standard in the literature, which enables us to identify distinct drivers of demand. In addition to 
the income-related demand effect (our primary variable of interest) we also test for a scale effect 
(related to the value of assets or number of people exposed) and a substitution effect, where 
insurance offers an alternative to adaptation. The empirical challenge on the supply side is the 
absence of data on adaptation effort (e.g., adaptation spending) and the correlation of efficiency 
factors with income. We experiment with different data sets and model structures to overcome 
this problem, although the identification of supply-side effects remains weak. 
We also deviate from the previous literature by employing a different dataset, the natural 
catastrophe (NatCat) database of Munich Re. This database is arguably more comprehensive in 
its coverage of disaster events, compared to the standard EM-DAT database (see further 
discussion in Section 3). One advantage of the NatCat data is that they include damage estimates 
for a far greater number of events than in EM-DAT, allowing us to provide results not just for 
lives lost, as is customary, but also for asset damages. We study losses from floods and tropical 
cyclones, the two largest climate-related disaster categories in terms of damages and fatalities. 
Another advantage is that Munich Re also provides estimates of insured losses, which enables us, 
for the first time, to identify any substitution effects between adaptation and insurance.  
The data also allow us to control systematically for event magnitude. Past studies often fail to 
distinguish between events of different magnitude, or do so only partially. For example, Noy 
(2009), Kahn (2005), Keefer et al. (2011), Anbarci et al. (2005) and Schumacher and Strobl 
(2011) control for earthquake magnitude only, while Bakkensen (2013) and Hsiang and Narita 
(2012) include magnitude data for tropical cyclone events only. Nordhaus (2010), Mendelsohn et 
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al. (2010), Hsiang (2010), and Strobl (2011) include hurricane magnitude data, but focus 
exclusively on the US. Neumayer et al. (2013) is one of the few papers to include global data for 
multiple disaster types, while controlling for magnitude in each case.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a simple theoretical model that 
introduces the two channels (demand and supply-side efficiency) through which income affects 
climate security.  Section 3 sets up our empirical model, the results of which are discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 discusses potential shortcomings and methodological refinements. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. A simple theoretical model 
We can think of adaptation to climate events as a consumption choice between two goods. The 
first good is climate security, A, and satisfies our desire to be safe from environmental harm. 
Natural disasters cause hardship well beyond the foregone value of consumption, and this creates 
a willingness to pay for climate security (see Norris et al. 2002 on the mental health impacts of 
disasters). The second good is a composite consumption good, C, which represents all other 
goods and services. 
 
For simplicity we keep the level of environmental harm constant. Households choose their 
preferred combination of climate security and consumption in the face of a given climate hazard. 
Evidently, the choice will be influenced by the nature of the hazard (i.e., the intensity and 
probability of extreme events) and society’s exposure to it (i.e., people and assets in risk zones). 
The relationship is often non-linear. For example, Schumacher and Strobl (2011) find that for 
minor hazards adaptation levels can be close to zero (see also Hsiang and Narita, 2012, and 
Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). In the empirical analysis we will control for these factors, but for 
the purposes of the theoretical model we assume a constant hazard level.  
  
The choice between consumption C and climate security A is then modelled as the interaction 
between the cost of producing A and the utility people derive from consuming it (for a dynamic 
model see Hallegatte 2011).  
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We start with a representative household and its utility function,          ̅ . Utility is a 
function of the two goods consumption, C, and climate security A. The utility function has the 
usual properties, i.e.,                         ;      .  Households have an 
exogenous income, Y, and they maximise utility subject to the budget constraint Y = C + πA, 
where π is the unit price of adaptation. The exogenous parameter  ̅ is there to remind ourselves 
that utility also depends on the level of climate hazard, which for the time being we keep 
constant. 
The optimisation problem                ̅    yields the first-order condition        , 
which can be solved for the optimal level of adaptation.  The demand function is 
            ̅                       (1) 
Differentiating the first-order condition, and remembering the second-order condition, confirms 
that   
       
    as one would expect. We are mostly interested in the first of the two 
derivatives. It is a standard income elasticity, although here we label it our demand effect. It tells 
us that as long as climate security is not an inferior good the demand for adaptation should go up 
as income rises. 
On the production side, climate security may be delivered by either public agents (governments) 
or private agents (firms). While they have different objective functions, their optimisation 
problem is structurally similar, and we can think of both as maximizing the net benefit (profit) 
from adaptation. The optimisation problem takes the form                  
The cost function, c, is convex in adaptation effort,               Costs also depend on an 
efficiency parameter, φ, which can be thought of as reflecting total factor productivity in the 
implicit production function.  We assume             ;       .  The first-order condition 
      can be solved for the supply function  
                                (2) 
where    
       
   . The price effect is as expected. The derivative with respect to φ states 
that as production efficiency increases, costs come down and supply goes up. This is our 
efficiency effect. 
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The hypothesis is that adaptation efficiency depends on factors such as institutional quality, 
social capital and an effective public sector that are also correlated with income. Owing to a 
positive spill-over from income to production efficiency a rise in income would then be expected 
to increase the supply (or reduce the cost) of adaptation.  
There is some evidence of such income-related spill-overs. Studies on adaptive capacity 
invariably highlight factors such as literacy, governance and access to credit, which are correlated 
with income (Barr et al. 2010; Brooks et al. 2005; Tol and Yohe 2007).  Miao and Popp (2013) 
find that risk-mitigating innovation increases with income. Further afield, total factor productivity 
in industry tends to be associated with similar factors (e.g., good institutions, Isaksson 2007), 
while Greene (2004) finds the efficiency of public health provision to be correlated with income.   
Despite these pointers the existence – and indeed the sign – of the efficiency effect cannot be 
ascertained a priori, however, and must await empirical confirmation.  
We are now in a position to calculate the market equilibrium by equating adaptation supply 
(equation 2) and demand (equation 1). More specifically we equate the inverse supply and 
demand functions    
      
  to eliminate the (unobserved) price and derive:  
            ̅                         (3) 
Equation (3) depicts the equilibrium relationship between climate security and income we wish to 
study – the adaptation deficit – and reintroduces the two channels through which an adaptation 
deficit might occur: An income effect,     that is positive as long as climate security is not an 
inferior good, and an efficiency effect,   , which we suspect may have some link to income. By 
differentiating the market equilibrium condition    
      
  we confirm 
                                  (4) 
Figure 1 summarises the two effects graphically, as an income-related shift in the demand for 
climate security and an efficiency related increase in the supply of climate security. 
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Figure 1: The adaptation deficit as a function of income and efficiency effects 
 
3. From theory to empirics 
A. Data 
We now turn to the empirical estimation of equation (3), using data from the Munich Re NatCat 
database. The Munich Re data are in many ways richer and less selective than the familiar EM-
DAT data commonly used to estimate global disaster impacts (www.emdat.be). The NatCat 
database records all natural hazard events worldwide that result in property damage or personal 
injury. In contrast, events are registered in EM-DAT only if one of the following criteria has been 
met: 10 or more people reported killed, a hundred or more people reported affected, a declaration 
of a state of emergency, or a call for international assistance.  
The difference is potentially important for the study of adaptation to disaster risk. Where 
adaptation levels are highest, events are less likely to exceed the inclusion criteria for EM-DAT 
and are therefore missing from studies relying on this data set. As an illustration, the Munich Re 
data set contains more than 31,000 disaster entries (approximately 20,000 for the period 1980-
2008), including 17,500 unique entries with positive recorded loss. In comparison, EM-DAT 
contains 8,105 natural disaster entries for the period 1980 to 2009, of which just 3,000 record a 
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loss estimate (Neumayer et al, 2013). EM-DAT is also known to exhibit certain biases related to 
the way in which data are compiled (e.g. Gall et al. 2009).  
The Munich Re data are not without gaps. In a comparison of three disaster databases (EM-DAT, 
NatCat and the Sigma database maintained by Swiss Re), Guha-Sapir and Below (2002) found 
that, across 120 events that were common to all three databases, economic damages were 
unreported in 58% of cases in NatCat (the equivalent figures for EM-DAT and Sigma were 62% 
and 66%, respectively). The number of events where fatalities were unreported was the same in 
each database (3%). It is also possible that the greater number of events in the NatCat database 
could be, at least partly, the result of the different approaches to the classification of events (as 
multiple versus single occurrences across different countries or over time), making comparisons 
across data bases more difficult.  
These issues notwithstanding, the Munich Re data are highly suitable to our purposes, given the 
greater coverage of disaster losses and the inclusion of insured losses in the data. For reasons of 
data quality and completeness we restrict our attention to the period 1980 to 2008, and we focus 
on the two climate-related events that account for most disaster deaths and economic damages: 
floods and tropical cyclones. Across the 25 event categories distinguished in the database, floods 
and cyclones account for 33% of deaths and 43% of economic damages. 
Reducing the sample in this way still leaves us with over 5,400 observations, drawn from more 
than 200 countries. Because our explanatory variables are only available at an annual frequency, 
we aggregate the events data to the country-year level. This process leaves us with 2,274 country-
year observations, comprised of 1,779 country-years with floods and 495 country-years with 
tropical cyclones. In our regressions, a number of disaster observations are lost where economic 
data (GDP) is not available for all country-years. 
Economic data (GDP, GDP per capita, and government spending) are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. Estimates of country size (area in km
2
) are from the Portland 
State University Country Geography data set (see http://www.pdx.edu/econ/country-geography-
data ). 
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B. Regression model 
An immediate complication in our estimation procedure is that we do not observe adaptation 
effort, A, our variable of primary interest. What NatCat records instead is the actual damage of 
natural disasters, D. We overcome the problem by postulating the following relationship between 
adaptation effort and observed damages (see for example Schumacher and Strobl 2011):  
                              (5) 
where I is a measure of the unmitigated physical impact of an event. From the disaster risk and 
climate change vulnerability literature (e.g., Field et al. 2012) we know that I is a function of the 
intensity or magnitude of an event (e.g. the wind speeds observed during a storm) and the 
sensitivity or exposure of society to events of given magnitude.  Equation (5) suggests that as 
long as we control for the factors explaining I, observed damages should be a reasonable 
indicator of adaptation effort. 
Based on equations (3) and (5) we can now formulate the basic structure of our empirical 
problem: 
                                     (6) 
where i and t denote country and time subscripts, respectively, and     is the error term. We will 
estimate the equation separately for each hazard type, using OLS and negative binomial 
regressions. Before we do so it is worth discussing the main variables. 
Our dependent variable,      , is measured in two ways: either as economic damages or as lives 
lost. Most of the existing literature concentrates on the human costs of disaster events (e.g. 
Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008, Anbarci et al. 2005, Kahn 2005). Relatively few studies have 
used economic damages as the outcome of interest (exceptions include Schumacher and Strobl, 
2011, and Neumayer et al. 2013). This reflects, at least in part, concerns about the reliability of 
economic damage estimates (see discussion of data quality above).  
On the right-hand side the equation includes three types of explanatory variables.  We use lagged 
values for most of them (excluding disaster magnitude) in order to avoid any potential 
endogeneity bias. 
12 
 
The first set of controls,     , is a vector of variables to normalize the intensity of events and the 
exposure of countries to events, as suggested by equation (5). The intensity of events is controlled 
by top wind speed in the case of tropical cyclones and by local precipitation in the case of floods. 
The data on top wind speeds are obtained from the Munich Re database. In aggregating events to 
the annual level, it is necessary to take account of the non-linear relationship between wind speed 
and damages. The best estimate appears to be a cubic relationship (see Emanuel, 2005; and 
Bakkensen, 2013). We therefore take the cubed power of top wind speed prior to aggregating 
across multiple events.  
In the case of floods, no intensity variables are included in the Munich Re database, and we use 
precipitation data from Neumayer et al. (2013) instead. These data represent local rainfall 
anomalies (deviations from long-term averages) associated with a particular flood event.  
Exposure of a country is controlled by population, in the case of disaster deaths, and by GDP in 
the case of economic damages. GDP represents the flow of income derived from productive 
assets and should therefore be a reasonable proxy for the value of the capital stock. We also 
include land area as a measure of impact density. The intuition is that, for a given population size 
or GDP, a larger land area reduces the likelihood that a disaster event will strike a heavily 
populated or asset-rich zone.
 
The final exposure variable is a time trend to capture changes over 
time in technology or disaster reporting (which are common across countries).  
The second element of the equation,      , is a vector of variables intended to measure the 
drivers of adaptation demand. The vector includes income per capita, insurance coverage (insured 
losses as a % of total) and disaster propensity The expected effect of income per capita follows 
straight-forwardly from our theoretical model. The disaster propensity variable (from Neumayer 
et al., 2013) captures the average exposure of a country to a given disaster type over the long-
term. A higher long-term exposure increases the incentive to undertake costly adaptation 
measures (see also Hsiang and Narita 2012, Schumacher and Strobl 2011, and Keefer et al. 
2011). Disaster propensity is therefore a relevant component of the demand effect. We also 
include insurance coverage as part of our demand effect. Insurance is a close substitute for 
adaptation, and we would expect a negative relationship between the extent of insurance cover 
and the demand for adaptation. 
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The third element of equation (6) is our measure of efficiency,      . Our ability to identify an 
efficiency effect is constrained on two fronts. The first best option would be to measure 
adaptation effort and test directly for its efficiency. However, data on adaptation spending is 
patchy at best. As far as we are aware, no systematic cross-country comparisons or databases 
exist. Measuring adaptation efforts is clearly a priority for future research efforts. 
Our efforts to measure efficiency are further complicated by the close correlation between 
income and the various factors associated with greater adaptive efficiency, such as literacy, 
governance, and public services, as highlighted in studies of adaptive capacity (see e.g. Barr et al. 
2010; Brooks et al. 2005; Tol and Yohe 2007). Indeed, our theoretical model predicts that 
efficiency gains occur through a positive spill-over from income to production efficiency, making 
the two effects difficult to distinguish empirically (see section 2).  
We have systematically tested for all the factors generally thought to be associated with 
adaptation efficiency – including for example literacy, life expectancy, institutional quality, 
income inequality, financial sector development, trade openness and macroeconomic stability – 
but failed to establish any consistent relationship with damages from disasters. This may have 
been because efficiency effects are not present in the data, or it could be that the high correlation 
between these variables and income prevented us from isolating efficiency effects from the 
demand effects. 
We instead report on two further tests for the presence of efficiency effects. In the first test, we 
use government spending (as a % of GDP) as a proxy for the quality of public services (such as 
early warning systems and evacuation procedures) and test its effect on the impact of disasters. 
Government spending (as a % of GDP) is positively correlated with income (the correlation 
coefficient is around 0.5 in our sample), but not to the same extent as other efficiency-related 
variables, such as political risk (a measure of institutional quality), life expectancy and financial 
sector development (all of which have correlation coefficients of 0.7 or above with respect to 
income, for our sample).  
As a second test for efficiency effects we divide our sample between OECD (or more broadly 
high-income) countries and non-OECD (non-high income) countries. If there are income-related 
spillover effects, we would expect higher income countries to be more efficient in the provision 
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of adaptation. Controlling for demand-side effects, a given event should cause lower losses in the 
rich (OECD) sub-sample.  
4. Empirical results 
A. Full sample results 
Results for our full sample of countries are presented in Tables 1-4. Our calculations distinguish 
between two measures of impact (lives lost, economic damages) and two types of hazards 
(floods, cyclones), resulting in four sets of regressions. While our main focus is on cross-
sectional results (representing comparisons of long-term adaptation across countries), we also 
include specifications that include country fixed effects (corresponding to short-term adaptations 
for a given country).  
Across all four tables, the consistency of the coefficients on the magnitude variables (rain and 
wind) provides reassurance that these measures – albeit imperfect approximations of event 
severity – offer strong explanatory power in each case. We also find, as expected, that impact 
increases with exposure, that is, fatalities increase with population and damages with the value of 
assets exposed (GDP). The validity of our modelling setup is further supported by the relatively 
high R-squared values, with our models generally explaining between 40 and 50% of the 
variation in damages and fatalities across countries.  
Across both asset damages and fatalities, we find strong evidence in support of the demand-side 
hypothesis, based on the coefficients on GDP per capita. At higher income, demand for 
adaptation is higher and losses for a given event (controlling for severity and exposure) will be 
lower. However, GDPpc is not significant in the regressions that include country fixed effects, 
indicating that it is differences in income levels across countries, rather than changes in income 
over time, that matter for disaster losses. 
As expected, insurance is positively associated with damages and fatalities.  Insurance acts as a 
substitute for adaptation and leads to moral hazard: agents with high insurance cover are less 
inclined to invest in adaptation. This finding is consistent across all model specifications, 
including those that include country fixed effects. Damages are found to increase one-for-one 
with the proportion of losses insured, while for fatalities the elasticities are much lower. 
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Turning to our attempts to identify efficiency effects, we find mixed evidence on the role of 
government spending – our proxy for public services like emergency services and social safety 
nets – in determining losses from disasters. Higher government spending is associated with fewer 
deaths from both floods and tropical cyclones, suggesting some relative efficiency in reducing the 
number of people killed by disasters for countries with higher government spending.  
However, the results are not consistent across the asset-damage regressions. In one model 
specification, higher government spending is associated with higher damages. This might be 
because government spending is also associated with more infrastructure assets (controlling for 
GDP), and therefore higher exposure. However, the lack of consistency in the findings makes us 
cautious about interpreting the results in relation to government spending.  
One possibility is that, rather than measuring public service quality, government spending is 
simply a proxy of public adaptation and therefore determined by a combination of both demand 
and supply effects. However, we did not find evidence to support this idea in the, admittedly 
sparse, data that we were able to compile on (public) adaptation spending. Looking at the cross 
section, there is no strong correlation between government spending and adaptation spending 
between countries, although for a given country public adaptation spending does appear to 
respond to changes in general government spending (see Committee on Climate Chang 2014 for 
the UK and Geloof and Kruik 2012 for the Netherlands; also 
http://www.aideffectiveness.org/CPEIR for Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Philippines and 
Cambodia).  
B. Splitting the sample 
In a further attempt to identify efficiency effects, we split our sample into rich country (OECD 
and other high income) and poor country (non-OECD, non-high income) sub-samples and repeat 
our analysis. The results are presented in tables 5 – 8. Our focus here is on the elasticity of 
impacts (asset damages or fatalities) with respect to the magnitude of the disaster event. 
Controlling for demand effects (via GDPpc), and exposure (via total GDP or population), we are 
interested in how responsive impacts are to the severity of the event across our sub-samples. If 
income is associated with more efficient adaptation, then we would expect to find lower 
elasticities with respect to event magnitude in the rich sub-sample.  
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Our results show – if anything – the opposite pattern; the elasticity of asset damages with respect 
to event magnitude is clearly bigger in the rich sub-sample. However, this difference is attenuated 
when we control for insurance, indicating again that insurance acts as a substitute for adaptation 
(at least in our rich sub-sample). For fatalities the elasticities across sub-samples are very similar. 
The income elasticities are also worth comment. They appear to be larger in the rich sub-sample 
(this is most noticeable for tropical cyclone events). This suggests non-linearity in the income-
impact relationship, but could also be evidence of relative efficiency – higher income has a 
bigger impact in reducing losses in rich countries than for the lower-income sample. However, it 
could equally be interpreted as simply different priorities, if richer countries are willing to devote 
a greater proportion of their incomes to adaptation efforts.  
Again, we are unable to identify definitively an efficiency effect in our data and must conclude 
either that efficiency effects are minor, or that our data are inadequate to separate efficiency from 
demand effects. 
5. Methodological discussion 
We next explore methodological issues to ascertain the validity of our findings.  A first question 
to ask is whether there might have been other, superior model specifications. An alternative – and 
subject to data availability perhaps superior – way to measure the efficiency component of the 
model would be stochastic frontier analysis (developed by Aigner et al. 1977, and Meeusen and 
van den Broeck 1977). Stochastic frontier analysis has been used in numerous papers on the 
productive or cost efficiency of firms. However, the approach was primarily designed to measure 
production inefficiencies across firms that are relatively homogenous (e.g. a sample of firms all 
operating in the same sector). It is less appropriate for cross-country comparisons involving large 
variation in economic and social conditions although there are cross-country applications (e.g. 
Greene 2004). The application of stochastic frontier analysis to our natural disaster data also 
poses methodological/conceptual challenges, such as a lack of data on input costs (e.g. how much 
is spent on climate protection measures) and the large proportion of zeroes in the casualty data, 
which require a model capable of handling non-normally distributed outcome variables (such as 
the negative binomial model that we use).  
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A second question to ask is whether there are any issues with the specification we did choose. 
The regressions involving economic damages as the outcome variable are estimated by standard 
OLS regressions, with a log-log model specification. Results with number of deaths as the 
outcome of interest were also obtained by OLS with a log-log specification (taking ln(1+number 
killed) as the outcome variable). This is for ease of comparison and interpretation of coefficients. 
However, given the distribution of disaster fatalities, with a large number of zeroes 
(approximately 23% of tropical cyclone country-years and 32% of flood country-years) we also 
provide results using the negative binomial regression. This model is preferred to a Poisson 
model due to the over-dispersion of the disaster fatalities data (the mean of this series is 214, with 
a standard deviation of 3,456) and is consistent with the existing literature (e.g. Keefer et al. 
2011, Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). We also experimented with alternative estimators to the 
negative binomial, notably a Poisson QMLE estimator, and the results are consistent.  
Another alternative would be the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model, given the 
relatively large number of zeros in the data. However, the ZINB model assumes that the data are 
the result of two distinct underlying processes, whereby a proportion of the observed zeroes are 
the result of some distinct category within the data for which the probability of zero is 1 (see 
Keefer et al. 2011). Given that our data are drawn from a database of natural disaster events, 
which by their very definition pose a threat to human life, an assumption of zero probability of 
death, even for a subset of the data, would seem too strong. 
A third concern is whether we control appropriately for the intensity of events, that is, the 
completeness of vector I.   The destructiveness of storms in particular has many dimensions – 
including wind speed, rainfall, forward velocity and radius of maximum winds (Strobl, 2010) – 
which we are unable to capture fully. Similarly, the intensity of a flood event is unlikely to be 
fully captured by local precipitation data, as factors such as local topography are also relevant. 
Our disaster magnitude variables are thus, of necessity, rough proxies for the true intensity of the 
experienced event. However, as our magnitude variables are highly significant predictors of 
disaster losses they represent an improvement on omitting this factor from the analysis entirely.  
The way differences in exposure are controlled for needs to strike a balance between accuracy 
and exogeneity. By choosing population and land mass as the main controls we opt for variables 
that are clearly exogenous. Other measures of people and assets at risk, e.g., those located in 
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hazard zones, may offer a more precise description of exposure, but the decision to locate in 
hazard zones is arguably influenced by the desire to manage the risks involved. That is, it reflects 
endogenous adaptive behaviour. We have included a time trend, which captures trends in location 
behaviour over time that are common across countries. We also experimented with specifications 
that included urbanisation as an additional control, but found this variable to be insignificant.  
This gives us some reassurance that differences in exposure and sensitivity are adequately 
controlled for. 
Our analysis has focused on two specific disaster categories, floods and tropical cyclones. Other 
important climate-related disasters are not included, notably droughts, heat waves and wind 
storms. There has been some work on the economic impact of heat waves (Martin et al. 2011), 
but the data to do so systematically is lacking. A disaster category that is amenable to systematic 
analysis, and in fact accounts for a large proportion of disaster losses, is earthquakes. Earthquakes 
are of less interest here, given our focus on climate-related adaptation, and they already feature 
prominently in the literature (e.g. Anbarci et al. 2005, and Keefer et al. 2011).  
5.  Conclusions 
This paper analyses the link between income and adaptation to past and future climate events.  It 
is widely accepted that poor countries are more heavily affected by extreme weather events and 
hence future climate change than rich countries. The discrepancy has even been given its own 
name: the adaptation deficit.  We argue theoretically that the adaptation deficit may be due to two 
factors: A demand effect, whereby the demand for the good ―climate security‖ increases with 
income, and an efficiency effect, which works as a spill-over externality on the supply-side. 
Because of these spill-overs, adaptation productivity is enhanced in the socio-economic context 
of high-income economies.   
We find empirically that there is a strong and unambiguous demand effect. An increase in per 
capita income reduces the impacts of extreme events in all cases and for most model 
specifications (except those including country fixed effects).  A higher income also increases the 
demand for substitutes to adaptation, in particular insurance cover, but the demand effect remains 
strong even if we control for this factor.  
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There is much more ambiguity about the efficiency effect. We find some evidence of efficiency 
spill-overs associated with government spending (a measure of adaptation-related public goods, 
such as safety nets and emergency response systems), but overall the empirical evidence is patchy 
and weak.  
We cannot conclude from this that there is no efficiency effect. Rather, we hypothesise that the 
efficiency effect may be masked by the demand effect and determine that the data are insufficient 
for its identification. A more conclusive analysis would require better data on adaptation effort – 
the amount of capital and resources devoted to disaster risk management and adaptation. 
Information about adaptation spending is limited, especially but not only in developing countries, 
and we see it as a research priority to close this gap. 
Research on the link between economic growth and resilience to climate risk is still patchy, and 
there is scope for further analysis also in other areas. One important question which has not been 
addressed is how income changes the sensitivity of economies to climate events. We account for 
this crudely by controlling for either GDP or population size. However, there are much richer 
dynamics, which remain unexplored, of how trends like economic diversification, globalization, 
urbanization and migration to coasts affect the long-term vulnerability of countries to climate 
risk. 
While research on these questions continues, some policy implications can already been drawn. 
Perhaps the most powerful lesson concerns the importance of inclusive (and low-carbon) growth 
policies as a way to close the adaptation deficit from the demand side. We know that some 
development policies can increase vulnerability to climate events (Bowen et al. 2012), but 
climate-sensitive development is clearly an important complement to dedicated adaptation 
policies.  
While our results are equivocal on the efficiency effect, we do not conclude that development 
assistance is all that is needed, as suggested by for example Schelling (1992, 1997).  There is 
enough evidence to suspect that adaptation efficiency might be uneven and that some countries or 
adaptation actors might require help to put in place an effective adaptation response. And even if 
current response systems are efficient, most developing countries will need help to handle the 
step change from current climate vulnerability to future climate change. 
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Table 1: Damages from floods, full sample 
Dep var: ln damages (millions of 1995 USD)   
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln Rain 0.671*** 0.602*** 0.615*** 0.607*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ln GDP 0.874*** 0.845*** 0.883*** 1.141 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (1.10) 
Ln GDPpc -0.285* -0.524*** -0.575*** -0.786 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (1.02) 
Ln insured (% of damages)  0.962*** 0.962*** 0.994*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Ln Gov Exp (% of GDP)   -0.021 -0.193 
   (0.31) (0.34) 
     
Country Fixed Effects N N N Y 
Obs. 1635 1635 1578 1578 
Countries 151 151 144 144 
R-Sq 0.3347 0.4088 0.4243 0.4098 
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1, 2 and 3 also control for country 
area (in km
2
) and flood propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 2: Damages from tropical cyclones, full sample 
Dep var: ln damages (millions of 1995 USD)   
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln (top wind speed)
3
 1.415*** 1.103*** 1.090*** 1.120*** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) 
Ln GDP 0.885*** 0.681*** 0.734*** -0.185 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (2.86) 
Ln GDPpc -0.445* -0.827*** -1.037*** 1.034 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.18) (2.75) 
Ln insured (% of damages)  1.057*** 1.042*** 1.069*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
Ln Gov Exp (% of GDP)   1.288** -0.029 
   (0.63) (1.06) 
     
Country Fixed Effects N N N Y 
Obs. 344 344 337 337 
Countries 44 44 44 44 
R-Sq. 0.3880 0.4976 0.5092 0.2836 
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1, 2 and 3 also control for country 
area (in km
2
) and tropical cyclone propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Fatalities from floods, full sample 
Dep var: ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths deaths deaths 
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS NB NB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ln Rain 0.291*** 0.284*** 0.293*** 0.296*** 0.319*** 0.323*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Ln Population 0.685*** 0.682*** 0.694*** -0.027 0.687*** 0.649*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.49) (0.09) (0.09) 
Ln GDPpc -0.335*** -0.361*** -0.346*** -0.102 -0.711*** -0.652*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) 
Ln insured (% of damages)  0.094** 0.098** 0.193***  0.177** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) 
Ln Gov Exp (% of GDP)   -0.355** -0.126  -1.027*** 
   (0.16) (0.21)  (0.26) 
       
Country FE N N N Y N N 
Obs. 1635 1635 1578 1578 1635 1578 
Countries 151 151 144 144 151 144 
R-Sq. 0.4577 0.4596 0.4795 0.2132   
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1-3, 5 and 6 also control for 
country area (in km
2
) and flood propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4: Fatalities from tropical cyclones, full sample 
 
Dep var: ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths deaths deaths 
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS NB NB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ln (top wind speed)
3
 0.701*** 0.633*** 0.655*** 0.634*** 1.020*** 0.795*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Ln Population 0.679*** 0.634*** 0.630*** 1.319 0.808*** 0.643*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (1.23) (0.13) (0.12) 
Ln GDPpc -0.511*** -0.639*** -0.601*** -0.302 -0.593*** -0.754*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.30) (0.10) (0.08) 
Ln insured (% of damages)  0.230** 0.252** 0.314***  0.516*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.10) 
Ln Gov Exp (% of GDP)   -0.232 -0.793  -1.087*** 
   (0.34) (0.61)  (0.34) 
       
Country FE N N N Y N N 
Obs. 344 344 337 337 344 337 
Countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 
R-Sq. 0.5136 0.5281 0.5341 0.2929   
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1, 2 and 3 also control for country 
area (in km
2
) and tropical cyclone propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Damages from floods, split sample 
Dep var: ln damages (millions of 1995 USD)     
 OECD (and other high income) Non-OECD (non-high income) 
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ln Rain 1.061*** 0.750*** 0.722*** 0.593*** 0.572*** 0.549*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Ln GDP 0.531*** 0.511*** 0.761 0.988*** 0.962*** 0.812 
 (0.13) (0.08) (2.40) (0.14) (0.14) (1.50) 
Ln GDPpc -0.252 -0.641*** -0.377 -0.565*** -0.588*** -0.489 
 (0.24) (0.21) (2.08) (0.20) (0.20) (1.44) 
Ln Insured (% of dam’s)  1.033*** 1.059***  0.789*** 0.751*** 
  (0.07) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.16) 
       
Country Fixed Effects N N Y N N Y 
Obs. 453 453 453 1182 1182 1182 
Countries 41 41 41 110 110 110 
R-Sq 0.3207 0.5079 0.4823 0.3303 0.3476 0.3440 
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1-2, and 4-5 also control for 
country area (in km
2
) and flood propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 6: Damages from tropical cyclones, split sample 
 
Dep var: ln damages (millions of 1995 USD)     
 OECD (and other high income) Non-OECD (non-high income) 
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ln (top wind speed)
3
 1.880*** 1.252*** 1.289*** 1.261*** 1.031*** 1.007*** 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.20) 
Ln GDP 1.392*** 0.998*** 0.808 0.666** 0.555* 1.803 
 (0.37) (0.27) (4.58) (0.29) (0.28) (4.66) 
Ln GDPpc -2.799** -2.792** -0.556 -0.286 -0.455 -0.948 
 (1.23) (1.17) (5.30) (0.39) (0.39) (4.23) 
Ln insured (% of dam’s)  1.267*** 1.178***  0.963*** 0.987*** 
  (0.15) (0.19)  (0.17) (0.26) 
       
Country Fixed Effects N N Y N N Y 
Obs. 110 110 110 234 234 234 
Countries 11 11 11 33 33 33 
R-Sq 0.4996 0.6639 0.5682 0.3181 0.3870 0.2615 
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1-2, and 4-5 also control for 
country area (in km
2
) and tropical cyclone propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Fatalities from floods, split sample 
 OECD (and other high income) Non-OECD (and non-high income) 
Dep var:  ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths deaths ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths deaths 
Model: OLS OLS OLS NB OLS OLS OLS NB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Ln Rain 0.338*** 0.291*** 0.265*** 0.577*** 0.276*** 0.270*** 0.290*** 0.222*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Ln Population 0.451*** 0.448*** -0.383 0.920*** 0.812*** 0.804*** -0.073 0.801*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.71) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.68) (0.09) 
Ln GDPpc -0.285 -0.347* -0.258 -1.102*** -0.118* -0.133* -0.040 -0.377*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.33) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.10) 
Ln Insured (% of 
damages) 
 0.157*** 0.200*** 0.260***  0.241** 0.188 0.838* 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.48) 
         
Country Fixed 
Effects 
N N Y N N N Y N 
Obs. 453 453 453 453 1182 1182 1182 1182 
Countries 41 41 41 41 110 110 110 110 
R-Sq 0.3411 0.3727 0.2274  0.4347 0.4386 0.0997  
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1-2, 4-6 and 8 also control for 
country area (in km
2
) and flood propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 8: Fatalities from tropical cyclones, splitg sample 
 
 OECD (and other high income) Non-OECD (and non-high income) 
Dep var:  ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths deaths ln deaths ln deaths ln deaths deaths 
Model: OLS OLS OLS NB OLS OLS OLS NB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Ln (top wind 
speed)
3
 
0.653*** 0.580** 0.624** 0.875*** 0.724*** 0.635*** 0.593*** 0.780*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) 
Ln Population 1.060*** 1.014*** 7.748 1.329*** 0.642*** 0.599*** 3.485** 0.716*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (4.45) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (1.57) (0.10) 
Ln GDPpc -1.239* -1.285* -0.593 -1.641*** -0.525*** -0.634*** -0.211 -0.758*** 
 (0.58) (0.65) (0.73) (0.51) (0.12) (0.12) (0.30) (0.11) 
Ln insured (% of 
damages) 
 0.148** 0.173*** 0.299***  0.375* 0.498** 0.593*** 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.09)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
         
Country Fixed 
Effects 
N N Y N N N Y N 
Obs. 110 110 110 110 234 234 234 234 
Countries 11 11 11 11 33 33 33 33 
R-Sq 0.5765 0.5891 0.2949  0.4160 0.4416 0.1851  
Standard errors clustered by country, in parentheses. All models include a year trend. Models 1-2, 4-6 and 8 also control for 
country area (in km
2
) and tropical cyclone propensity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
